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Almost everyone agrees that improving education is the key to economic
development in the 21st century. Schools elevate the skills and knowledge of
the work force. Strong local educational systems attract and retain businesses
and pay large economic returns through higher productivity and incomes.
Education may not be the mother of economic development, but it matters as
much as anything else, and probably a lot more.
Not surprisingly, the business community is often one of the most vocal
supporters of education. Clearly, it needs an improving stock of human capital
to compete in the increasingly knowledge-based economy. Business leaders
know they must invest in education because the economy will grow and prosper
in the future only to the extent that the community cultivates its human capital
stock today. Most citizens seem to agree with business, with voters often
backing educational funding over other state and local government programs.
Thus, asserting that
education is a linchpin of
economic development is
hardly controversial. Yet
oddly when it comes to
public finance, it
sometimes seems that
human capital is an
afterthought, secondary to
attracting physical capital
with targeted property tax
Hand Middle School in Columbia, South Carolina, a breaks. A potential
conflict arises between
city school in Richland School District 1, was the
winner of the 1999 "Palmetto's Finest" award. Will school financing and
certain property tax-based economic development economic development
incentives offered by the state threaten the fiscal
incentives because public
well-being of this and other schools?
education depends largely
on local property taxes. If and when property taxes are cut, the effects on school
district budgets are usually felt immediately. Property taxes are the fiscal
foundation of schools -- in effect, an endowment for children. But in the rush to
find ways to promote economic development, school property tax revenue
sometimes has been diverted to fund roads, sewers, and other infrastructure
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improvements that may build the physical capital base while ignoring critical
human capital needs and commitments.
No case better illustrates the potential conflict between education finance and
economic development than Myrtle Beach (Horry County), South Carolina. In
1999, a proposal for a large-scale economic development project raised
awareness across South Carolina and the nation concerning the implications of
incentives on education. The proposal, presented to Horry County Council and
the City of Myrtle Beach by a local development company, called for the
creation of a multi-county business park (MCBP) covering approximately 8,300
acres. It would use 100 percent of commercial property tax revenues for
noneducational purposes.
The Horry County Board of Education, along with local citizens, raised serious
concerns about the long-term implications of this proposal: How would it affect
the ability of the district to fund educational services in the district? The
developer's proposal would remove more than $2 billion in commercial
property from the school district's tax base. Locked into a 30-60 year plan, the
district was concerned that this could have a detrimental impact on the district's
ability to fund education in Horry County. By removing such a large and
important component from the tax base, the district faces shifting the tax burden
to other property owners in the county in order to maintain educational quality.
The Horry County case brought media attention to an issue that has been
simmering since business incentives heated up in the 1980s. Newspaper articles
and national TV news stories openly questioned whether South Carolina had
gone too far in actively seeking new business -- risking future educational
attainment as its escalating incentives pushed it into fiscal fratricide with other
states.
This article looks at the largely unintended consequences of expanding
economic development incentives in South Carolina. Most citizens, no doubt,
expect government to actively recruit new business, not only to attract new
capital, but to create employment. Yet in this article, we argue that certain types
of development incentives, especially if they proliferate into commercial and
other property, could be detrimental to the long-run future of public education.
That is something most citizens do not want.
It should be stated unequivocally at the outset that education is compatible with
economic development initiatives. Indeed, educational and economic
development advocates are natural allies: incentives help provide physical
capital; education helps provide human capital. Both are needed to achieve
economic progress. By reassessing incentives we create the kind of economic
future we will require for our children. In the next section, we look at why
South Carolina has become so aggressive in offering tax incentives.
South Carolina's Push For Economic Development
Economic development incentives expanded widely in the 1980s, but to
understand why they were seen as necessary then (and continue today), it may
be worthwhile to take a brief look at economic development in South Carolina.
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For the past 100 years, with expanding educational opportunities and real
improvements in the quality of the work force, South Carolina has steadily
increased its standard of living. Figure 1 shows how far the state's standard of
living has progressed. Note first the sharp decline during the post-Civil War
reconstruction era, when the education system slumped to its nadir. Then,
between 1900 and 2000, the state's per capita income relative to the U.S.
average (expressed as a percentage of the U.S. average) began to climb from
less than 40 percent to almost 80 percent. As the state's educational system
improved, its productivity improved, and its standard of living grew
accordingly.
Continuing this kind of progress
in the 21st century will take a
more knowledge-driven and
entrepreneurial business climate
Ñ an economic model that every
state strategic plan advocates.
The quality of public schools
will be an increasingly
important factor in business
firms' decisions to move in,
expand, contract, or shut down
plants. At the same time,
economic growth affects schools. Nationally, there is evidence that rapid growth
puts strains on both operating and capital budgets for local governments,
including schools, even in the absence of any tax incentives that might drain
potential revenue from schools.
So, why do we have incentives? South Carolina, like many states, faces
continual pressure to propel economic development. In some cases, this may
mean making it more profitable for firms to locate in South Carolina, where tax
rates have traditionally run higher than other states. In particular, new capital
investment in manufacturing is deterred by relatively high property taxes.
The push for cutting property taxes for businesses goes back 30 years. As the
Northern manufacturing belt experienced deindustrialization in the early 1970s,
the state's manufacturing base in textiles and apparel began a dramatic
restructuring. After peaking at almost 230,000 jobs in 1973, the textile and
apparel employment base has shrunk every year since, falling to 106,000 in
2000 (see Figure 2). Thus, the sector most responsible for South Carolina's
transition from an agricultural to an industrial state was no longer viable as a
source of secure employment.
South Carolina acted
aggressively to rebuild its
physical capital base, focusing
on a strategy to attract industry
from outside its borders rather
than generating indigenous
capital through entrepreneurial
activity. State and local
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development missions to
foreign countries bore fruit, and
new firms opened plants where
former textile mills stood
shuttered.
The success in attracting physical capital to South Carolina can be gleaned from
Figure 3. According to the South Carolina Department of Commerce figures
depicted in the graph, new capital investment jumped dramatically after
economic development incentives expanded in the 1980s. Property tax
incentives for businesses were deemed to be crucial in luring new plants and
encouraging expansions. Property tax reductions (through a variety of schemes)
are believed to be among the most successful incentives because they brought
manufacturing assessment down considerably and made South Carolina more
competitive in property taxes with neighboring states. One of South Carolina's
unique incentive programs Ñ the multi-county business park Ñ started in the
1980s as the multi-county industrial park and expanded significantly in scale
and scope in the 1990s. The incentive programs were designed to attract large
capital investments in manufacturing, but were extended to include smaller
industrial projects and today can be applied to commercial development, as
well.
No doubt attracting new industry and promoting economic growth is important.
Moreover, incentives need not be detrimental to school finances. To assess the
impact of new industry on schools, the authors analyzed the impact of adding a
large industrial component to the tax base and/or experiencing industrial growth
in a school district on such fiscal variables as the millage rate, local revenue per
pupil, total revenue per pupil, and per-pupil spending. These factors were
considered overall as well as in relation to district size. In general, having more
industry in the tax base appears to have a moderately positive impact in terms of
lower millage rates and more local revenue per pupil, but the effects are not
strong. In the case of economic growth, the benefits of additional local revenue
are modest and more than offset by reduced state aid as a result of a higher
index of taxpaying ability. Small, less industrialized districts appear to benefit
more from new industry than larger, more industrialized ones.1
The problems with incentives emerged when they began to be used not just for
industrial development (the original intent), but for other types of business.
Incentives That Affect Schools
Although the list of incentives in South Carolina is long and varied, the focus of
this article is the state's incentives that affect property taxes and in particular,
the property tax base of a school district. The impact on property taxes is
critically important to schools because property taxes are the primary source of
local revenue for schools. Other local governments, especially cities and
counties, also depend on property taxes and are affected by these incentives, but
not to the same extent as schools. These other governments only rely on
property taxes for an average of 50 to 60 percent of the local revenue portion of
their budgets.
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It is true that school districts in
South Carolina receive a large
portion of their funds from state
sources, so property taxes
represent only a portion of total
school funding. The average
school district in South Carolina
receives about 60 percent of the
funds required for its operations
from the state. This percentage
varies according to how wealthy
a district is, ranging from a low
of about 1 percent for the wealthiest district to about 95 percent for the poorest
district. But regardless of what proportion of funds are provided by the state,
nearly all of the funds required to be generated locally must come from
property taxes.2 In addition, almost all of the debt service and capital
improvement expenditures for schools must come from local funds.
Therefore, since schools must rely heavily on property taxes to fund the local
share of their operating costs and most of their capital improvement costs, any
business incentive that affects the flow of property tax revenues is extremely
important to school districts.
In South Carolina, the following economic development incentives can affect
the property tax base of a school district, Tax Increment Financing Districts
(TIFs), Fee-in- Lieu of Taxes (FILOT), Multi-County Industrial Parks, and
Special Source Revenue Bonds. The main features of these incentives are given
below. 1. Tax Increment Financing (TIFs)
Originally a potential loss of revenue to school districts
State law was amended in 1999 to allow school districts to choose to
participate in a TIF or not
School districts protected and have a "vote" in negotiations
2. Fee-in-Lieu-of-Taxes (FILOT) -- Outside a Multi-County Industrial Park
Applies to manufacturing, not other classifications of property
Allows county councils to lower assessment ratio from 10.5 percent to 6
percent (and as low as 4 percent in large transactions) without the consent
of the affected school district
Suspends ad valorem taxes and imposes "fees"
Can freeze millage rates for up to 30 years
School districts generally protected but do not have a "vote" in
negotiations
Tax revenue is distributed in same manner and proportion as millage rate,
which generally protects a school district's revenue from use by the
county
3. Multi-County Industrial (or Business) Park (MCIP)
Multi-county agreement; many have one dominant and one nominal
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county
No restriction on land area, time limit, or type of "industry or business"
Can have FILOT in MCIP
All real and personal property is exempt from ad valorem taxes, but
"amount equivalent" to property tax is owed
County councils assert the authority to determine how the "equivalent
amount" is distributed among taxing districts, including all of FILOTs in
the MCIP
School districts are not protected
4. Special Source Revenue Bonds (SSRB)
Are available in MCIPs and FILOTs
Can lower tax revenues to all taxing entities through "credits"
School districts do not have a "vote" in negotiations
County councils assert the authority to determine how the reductions
affect taxing districts
School districts are not protected
TIFs are an important economic development tool, but they are generally used
for community development in cities and counties rather than direct incentives
offered to attract new industry. (The original intent of the law was to redevelop
blighted areas in decaying inner cities.) TIFs were amended in 1999 to allow
school districts to choose whether to participate in a TIF. Prior to 1999, a
municipality could create a TIF and use school tax revenues for up to 15 years
without the consent of the affected school district. This opt-out provision gives
school districts protection from having any property tax revenues generated by
millage assessed by the school district being used for non-school purposes
without the school district's consent. This change has not eliminated the use and
effectiveness of TIFs. Several TIFs have been created in South Carolina since
these changes were implemented. These TIFs have included some where the
school districts have participated and some where they have declined. The other
incentives are used as direct incentives to attract new and expanding industry,
and schools have had no voice or vote in their use.
Illustration of Incentive Impacts: The FILOT
As the following examples demonstrate, the FILOT within an MCIP and the
Special Source Revenue Bond incentives pose the greatest threat to a school
district's tax base. These two incentives can allow a county to redistribute the
"fees" (tax revenues) generated by the taxing entities in any way they want,
regardless of the relative share of the millage assessed by the taxing entities.
That is, the school district is not guaranteed that it will receive its fair share
(prorated share) of taxes from the property (regardless of the assessment ratio).
The following example may help illustrate this concept of "prorated" share.
First, assume a manufacturing company invests $10 million, and the property is
outside any municipality, is not in an MCIP, and does not negotiate a FILOT
agreement. Assume the millage rate in the county is 70 mills and the school
district's millage is 140 mills, for a total of 210 mills. The county's share of the
total millage assessed on property is 33 percent (70/210 = 33 percent) and the
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school district's share is 67 percent (140/210 = 67 percent). Without a FILOT
agreement, the company's property will be assessed at the constitutionally
established 10.5 percent rate. The company's property will have an assessed
value of $1,050,000 ($10,000,000 x .105 = $1,050,000). The company will pay
a total of $220,500 in county property taxes Ñ $73,500 in county taxes
($10,000,000 x .105 x .070 = $73,500) and $147,000 in local school taxes
($10,000,000 x .105 x .140 = $147,000). The school district will receive 67
percent of the taxes paid by the company Ñ exactly in proportion to its prorated
share of the total millage rate in the county.
If it is assumed that the company negotiates a FILOT agreement and the
company's property is assessed at 6.0 percent, the company's property will have
an assessed value of $600,000 ($10,000,000 x .06 = $600,000). The company
will pay a total of $126,000 in county property taxes Ñ $42,000 in county taxes
($10,000,000 x .06 x .070 = $42,000) and $84,000 in local school taxes
($10,000,000 x .06 x .140 = $84,000).
Even though the company's assessment ratio is reduced so that it pays 43
percent less taxes, the school district will still receive 67 percent
($84,000/$126,000 = 67 percent) of the taxes paid by the company Ñ exactly in
proportion to its prorated share of the total millage rate in the county (67
percent).
The ability to reduce the overall property tax liability of the manufacturing
company is the intent of the law, because South Carolina's property taxes on
manufacturing property are the highest among our neighboring states. Even
when a company negotiates an assessment ratio of 6 percent, the firm's property
taxes will still be higher in South Carolina than in North Carolina or Georgia.
When the law was first passed in the late 1980s, the incentive was only
available to companies investing at least $85 million or more. However, the
minimum amount of investment for a company to be eligible has been lowered
several times over the last 10 years and is now only $5 million. In fact, in six
extremely economically distressed counties, a minimum investment of only $1
million is enough to be eligible for incentives. This reduction in the minimum
investment level has led to a proliferation of FILOT agreements across the state.
The Multi-County Industrial Park: The Horry County Experience
The proliferation of FILOT agreements would not be as big a concern to the
school districts and as great a threat to their tax base if school districts were
guaranteed that they would always receive their prorated share of the property
tax revenues. The FILOT within an MCIP and the SSRB incentives, however,
do not provide school districts this protection. The Ho Horry County case offers
a good illustration of how the current laws allow a county government to
unilaterally decide how the total property tax revenues are to be distributed and
ultimately to divert school funds from school purposes and preclude schools
from receiving their prorated share of taxes.
In the spring of 1999, the Horry County Council received a proposal from
Burroughs & Chapin, a large, local development company, to create an MCIP
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(now called a Multi-County "Business" rather than "Industrial" Park) covering
approximately 4,000 acres in the county and the City of Myrtle Beach. Projects
included in the proposal changed over time, but the principal one was the
construction of "the Mall of South Carolina."
The proposal would lock in the MCIP for up to 30 years with an option to
renew for another 30 years, facilitate the annexation of several thousand acres
of land into the City of Myrtle Beach, freeze zoning, and limit impact fees in the
Park. However, the most important aspect of the proposal to the Horry County
School District was that it called for the use of 100 percent of commercial
property tax revenues from the $2 billion of investment to be diverted to
noneducational purposes. Note also that the development was not an industrial
project (it was primarily a shopping mall) and that it was not in an economically
distressed area.
Under the original proposal, the school district would not receive its prorated
share of revenues from the property (estimated to be 56.1 percent) but was to
receive zero revenues (0 percent). Using the MCIP and SSRB laws, the
proposal called for the county to redistribute tax revenues generated by the
school district's millage (113 mills) away from the school district and use them
for nonschool purposes such as road, sewer, water, and other infrastructure
improvements. The county estimated that if the school district received its
prorated share of the property tax revenues, the school district would receive
more than $214 million during the first 20 years of the MCIP. However, under
the county's plan, the district would receive nothing, i.e., would lose a potential
$214 million. The original proposal has been amended, and the county now
proposes to redistribute only a share of the school district's revenue away from
the district, not all of it. Under the current proposal, about $25 million of the
school district's prorated share would be redistributed by the county to
nonschool purposes (during the first 20 years of the 35-year MCIP). However,
the school district is not protected from future amendments to the agreement by
the county council.
Other Agreements
The Horry County case is a good example of how the school districts are not
guaranteed that they will receive their prorated share of revenues from an
economic development project as these laws are currently written. But Horry
County is not the only current example. Another county in South Carolina was
recently successful in attracting a major economic development project to its
area. The company reportedly invested more than $600 million. Because the
investment was more than $400 million, the company was eligible to negotiate a
FILOT assessment ratio of 4 percent, which it did. Assuming $600 million in
capital investment, an assessment ratio of 4 percent, and the 1998 average
millage rate in the county of 225 mills, the company would pay approximately
$5.4 million a year in FILOT fees (property taxes). Of this $5.4 million, the
school district would receive approximately $3.0 million.
However, the FILOT agreement negotiated by the county council requires the
company to pay a net amount of only $900,000 in fees per year to the county for
the next 20 years, and no fees at all for years 21-30. This fee agreement is
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equivalent to an assessment ratio of about 6/10 of 1 percent. The county issued
about $15 million in SSRBs for improvements for the company. In essence, the
county allowed the company to use its own tax payments to pay for some of its
development costs, and the school district's millage was used to generate about
two-thirds of these funds. According to the documents filed with the county, it
is unclear whether the school district will receive any revenues from the $600
million investment. By comparison, Union Camp invested about $600 million
in a facility in Richland County in 1992. This firm has paid over $41 million in
fees in the seven years since it signed a FILOT, an average of almost $6 million
a year.
As part of a research project, the 46 counties in South Carolina were requested
through a Freedom of Information Request (FOI) to provide documentation on
all FILOT, MCIP, and SSRB agreements that have been negotiated in their
respective counties. To date, only half of the counties have responded to the
request. However, based on the responses, the above examples are not
exceptions but are fairly typical of many of the agreements counties are
negotiating.
Growth in Use of FILOTs
The total fiscal impact of these incentives on the state's school districts is very
difficult to determine. At the present time, there are no statewide requirements
for counties to report the creation and use of multi-county industrial parks or the
use of special source revenue bonds. The South Carolina Department of
Revenue (SCDOR) collects data regarding FILOT agreements, but does not
publish detailed data on the agreements.
We do know that the frequency of companies negotiating FILOT agreements
has increased dramatically in recent years. According to data from the SCDOR,
there have been over 320 FILOT agreements negotiated since the law was
passed in 1987. Since that time, the state has received approximately $226
million from companies which entered into FILOT agreements. In 1998, the
state received about $61 million in fees. The SCDOR reports that there are
about 50 new agreements each year.
The minimum amount of investment required to be eligible to enter into a
FILOT has been reduced from the original $85 million -- first to $45 million in
the early 1990s, then to $5 million in 1995. This change has led to wider use of
the incentive and has, for most practical purposes, eliminated the 10.5 percent
assessment on new industrial property. At $5 million, nearly any new capital
investment by a manufacturer will be eligible for a FILOT. With the tremendous
competition for new investment, most county councils will be compelled to
offer the lower 6 percent assessment ratio.
Based on data from the SCDOR, during the five-year period from 1989 to 1994,
there were about five FILOT agreements negotiated per year. The average
amount of capital investment for these projects was about $157 million, and the
average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was about $1 million. This
contrasts sharply with the four-year period from 1995 to 1998 during which
there were about 75 FILOT agreements negotiated per year. The average
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amount of capital investment for these 300 or so FILOTs was about $15
million, and the average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was about
$130,000.

Estimated Revenue Losses from FILOT Agreements
Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient data prohibits a comprehensive analysis of
the tax revenues that school districts have not received. At this time, the only
data available are the approximate number of agreements and the total fees
collected. To accurately determine the lost revenues, it is necessary to know the
exact assessment ratios negotiated, the exact length of terms of the agreements,
the exact millage rates incorporated in the agreements, etc.
A preliminary estimate of the total school revenues that would have been
collected in the state can be made using available data. The methodology
incorporated in this analysis assumes average millage rates for school districts,
counties, and cities. These averages are those published in the South Carolina
Budget and Control Board's June 1999 edition of "1998 Local Government
Finance Report, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1997." This analysis assumes that all fee
agreements were negotiated from 10.5 percent to 6 percent. It also assumes that
all of the property included in the FILOT was in unincorporated areas of the
counties (industrial property is generally outside city limits).
Statewide, the average county millage rate in FY 1997 was 54.5 mills. The
average school millage rate in FY 1997 was 136.3 mills. The school millage
represents 71.4 percent of the total millage burden on real property. Of the $226
million in fees collected to date, an estimated 71.4 percent was generated by the
millage rates assessed by the schools. Assuming the school districts received
their prorated share of the fees generated from the total millage applied to the
FILOT (71.4 percent), the schools would have received approximately $161.4
million of the $226 million in fees. The county governments would have
received 28.6 percent, or approximately $64.6 million over the last 10 years or
so.
However, if there were no FILOT agreements in place, the real and personal
property would have been assessed at the 10.5 percent ratio rather than the
FILOT-lowered ratio of 6 percent. If this had been the case, the property that
has generated the $226 million in fees since 1987 would have generated $395.5
million, instead. Of the $395 million, school districts would have collected 71.4
percent, or $282.4 million Ð about $121 million more than they received under
the FILOT agreements. In 1998 alone, school districts would have received an
additional $52.5 million more than they actually did.
It must be noted, however, that the economic development community argues
that the schools did not forgo any revenue. They argue that if the incentives had
not been offered to the companies, then the companies would have located in
another state, and the school districts would have received none of the roughly
$161 million that they did receive. There is substantial evidence that this is the
case in many of the larger economic development projects. South Carolina's
property taxes on manufacturing investments are substantially higher than our
neighboring states. Without some method of offsetting the higher property tax
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burden on manufacturing, South Carolina would be at a distinct disadvantage
relative to its neighbors.
It appears that as long as the school districts receive their prorated share of the
fees a company pays, regardless of whether the assessment ratio is 10.5 percent,
6 percent, or even 4 percent, the burden on the school districts from any
reduction in assessment ratios will be on an relatively equitable basis with the
other local taxing entities. However, even this statement needs to be qualified
since as was stated earlier, other local governments such as counties and cities
are less dependent on property taxes than schools.
Conclusion
Property tax incentives no doubt were put in place with the best of intentions.
But so was kudzu. That notorious vine covering the Southeastern United States
was planted to halt soil erosion; incentives were put in place to halt industrial
erosion. Like kudzu, however, development incentives have spread to areas
where they were not originally intended. Fortunately, it is still possible to prune
them back to where they are truly effective in helping to improve South
Carolina's standard of living.
Every incentive that lowers a company's tax payments needs to be evaluated on
a cost-benefit basis to assess the incremental burden placed on the schools and
the local government by the new company and their employees. That way we
can ensure the state's human capital needs will not be shortchanged as the state
builds its physical capital.
Of most concern to school financing in South Carolina is the use of FILOT
agreements within Multi-County Industrial Parks and Special Source Revenue
Bonds incentives. Here, school districts are not guaranteed that they will always
receive their prorated share of the property tax revenues since the county
council negotiates the agreement and does not have to notify or have consent
from the school district. Instead, it is possible to divert all or a portion of
revenues that would have gone to the schools to support SSRB or other county
expenditures. With SSRBs, funds from the bonds are then used to support the
infrastructure investment associated with the development project (roads, sewer
lines, etc.). The much-publicized case in Horry County involves just this type of
development proposal.
It is very difficult to estimate the impact of these incentives on the state's school
districts. Preliminary projections estimate that school district revenues would
have been more than $121 million greater than they were had all manufacturing
property been assessed at the normal 10.5 percent rather than the lower 6
percent allowed by FILOTs. But at the present time, there are no statewide
requirements for counties to report the creation and use of MCIPs or the use of
SSRBs. Data are thus unavailable to even begin such an effort. Further, there is
no definitive answer to the development community's argument that without the
incentive, the schools would have received no funds since the companies would
have located in other states. It is clear, however, that the use of FILOTs within
MCIPs and using SSRBs put the schools in double jeopardy in that not only is
the pie smaller, but they are likely to receive an even smaller share of that pie Ð
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all without the school board's knowledge or consent. Other Southeastern states
have expanded their use of incentives (for example, North Carolina, Georgia,
and Tennessee), but none has used a Multi-County Industrial Park in
combination with Special Source Revenue Bonds as South Carolina has.
In the 2001 South Carolina legislative session, it is likely that proposals will be
considered protecting school taxes within Multi-County Industrial (Business)
Parks. The South Carolina School Boards Association and the state's
Association of Counties have been drafting a bill concerning these expanding
incentives. The School Boards Association has argued for a guarantee of 75
percent of its tax revenue, with the rest available for incentive deals. It also
insists that incentive awards adhere to the original aim of the legislation: to
attract manufacturing (rather than commercial development). The School
Boards Association has become increasingly aware of the potential impacts on
local school finance and now finds it necessary to advocate the interests of
children as the incentives spread to cover more and more of the economy.
As South Carolina and other states re-examine incentive programs, it is
important to recognize that many positive arguments remain in favor of
industrial recruitment and an active economic development agenda at the state
and local level. Incentives may have a positive differentiating effect on business
location decisions, especially when the characteristics of alternative locations
(say, Greenwood, South Carolina and Mayberry, North Carolina) are otherwise
similar. In addition, incentives bring fiscal benefits that outweigh the costs,
while spurring employment growth at the same time. No one would want to
deny a locality the prospect of good jobs if they are created at no cost to state
and local tax entities (at some level of positive fiscal benefits). After all, the
future well-being of children is ensured not by education alone, but by an
expanding and prospering economy, as well.
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Endnotes
1

Hefner, Frank L., Randolph C. Martin, Harry W. Miley, Jr., Holley Hewitt
Ulbrich, and Douglas P. Woodward, An Analysis of the Impacts of Property
Tax-Based Economic Development Incentives on School Districts in South
Carolina, prepared for the South Carolina Schools Boards Association, March
2000.
2

School districts receive a small amount of local funds from interest on funds
on deposit, rental of facilities, fees, etc.
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